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A PRINCIPLED LIMITATION FOR SECTION 504 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT: THE INTEGRITY-OF-THEPROGRAM TEST
INTRODUCTION

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19731 (Act) was enacted to
prohibit a recipient of federal funds 2 from discriminating against a handi1. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1982)). The section provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined
in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the
United States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
2. Whether a particular program or activity is considered to be a recipient of federal
funds for the purposes of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act has often been problematic. To
date there is no test or standard to facilitate identification of such recipients for the purpose of determining compliance with that section. The regulations of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) define "recipient" as:
any state or its political subdivision, any instrumentality of a state or its political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, organization, or other
entity, or any person to which Federal financial assistance is extended directly
or through another recipient, including any successor, assignee, or transferee of
a recipient, but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1984). "Federal financial assistance" is defined as:
any grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of
insurance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the Department
provides or otherwise makes available assistance in the form of:
(1) Funds;
(2) Services of Federal personnel; or
(3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property,
including:
(i) Transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market value or for
reduced consideration; and
(ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property if the Federal
share of its fair market value is not returned to the Federal Government.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1984). When the sole source of federal assistance is medicare and
medicaid payments, a program is covered by § 504. See United States v. Baylor Univ.
Medical Center, 736 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 958 (1985);
Bernard B. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1982); 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A, at 301 (1984). But see Silverstein
v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health Servs. Corp., 43 Colo. App. 446, 448-49, 614
P.2d 891, 892-93 (1979) (section 504 not applicable to employment discrimination claim
against program when sole federal assistance is medicare or medicaid payments). Other
relationships between the federal government and a particular program have been found
not to trigger the coverage of § 504. See, eg., Community Television v. Gottfried, 459
U.S. 498, 509-10 (1983) (receipt of broadcast license); Disabled in Action v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881, 884-85 (4th Cir. 1982) (rental of stadium built with federal
grant); Randolph v. Alabama Inst. for Deaf & Blind, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1718, 1721-22 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (federal procurement contracts); Cook v. Budget Rent-aCar Corp., 502 F. Supp. 494, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same). Two courts have divided
on whether the use of airports built with and receiving federal funds brings airlines under
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capped individual 3 "solely by reason of his handicap." 4 The purpose of
the section. Compare Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. CAB, 752 F.2d 694, 714 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (all airlines using federally assisted airports covered by § 504) with Jacobson v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1213-15 (9th Cir. 1984) (section 504 does not apply
to airlines because they pay for use of airports). The District of Columbia Circuit,
although it found airport use to trigger § 504 coverage, indicated that the receipt of exclusive operating licenses, favorable tax treatment, and the services of the national air
traffic control system did not trigger § 504. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 752 F.2d at
707-12; accord Jacobson, 742 F.2d at 1208-13.
Many courts, analogizing to the "primary objective" requirement imposed by § 604 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-3 (1982), had held that a
plaintiff's employment discrimination claim must arise in a program that provides employment as its primary objective. See, e.g., Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d
1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S. Ct. 1583 (1984); United States v. Cabrini
Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1981); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Trageser
v. Libbie Rehab. Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89-90 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
947 (1979). The Supreme Court, in holding that an employment claim can be brought
against any program receiving federal funds, found that the "primary objective" requirement was inappropriate because such a "drastic limitation on the handicapped individual's right to sue" was not contemplated by Congress, see Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1255 (1984) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1982)), notwithstanding the express statutory incorporation of "the remedies, procedures and rights of
Title VI" for such claims, see id. at 1255 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (1982)). However, the Court did not suggest a framework for defining the programs that would come
under § 504's ambit; rather, it indicated that such a procedural definition should be left to
the district courts. See id.; cf.Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 1220-21 (1984)
(grants of financial aid to students give rise to protection of Title IX only with regard to
specific program-here the school's financial aid department); North Haven Bd. of Edue.
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535-40 (1982) (same). The DarroneCourt also distinguished the
indirect aid at issue in Grove City from "nonearmarked direct grants," which are usually
at issue in employment programs. See Darrone, 104 S.Ct. at 1255.
3. The statutory definition for the term "handicapped individuals" reads:
Subject to the second sentence of this subparagraph, the term "handicapped
individual" means, for purposes of subchapters IV and V of this Act, any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. For purposes of sections 503 and 504 of this title as such sections relate to employment, such term
does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties
of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol
or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of
others.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
The HHS regulations amplify this definition. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.30)(2) (1984)
(describing the various " 'physical or mental impairments'" and " 'major life activities'"
contemplated by the statute, and explaining what is meant by " 'a record of'" and " 'regarded as having'" such an impairment); see generally E.E. Black Ltd. v. Marshall, 497
F. Supp. 1088, 1099-1102 (D. Hawaii 1980) (analyzing statutory definition); Haines, E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall: A PenetratingInterpretation of "HandicappedIndividual" for
Sections 503 and 504 of the RehabilitationAct of1973 andfor Various State Equal Oppor-

tunity Statutes, 16 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 527 (1983) (general discussion of ambiguous statutory definition of "handicapped"). A transitory illness, for example, has been found not
to meet the statutory definition. See Stevens v. Stubbs, 576 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D.
Ga. 1983) ("impairment" does not encompass illnesses having "no permanent effect on
person's health").
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the Act is "to develop and implement, through research, training, services, and the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living."5
Handicapped persons are thus guaranteed an equal opportunity to participate in federally funded programs.6 They are ensured the chance to
be judged as every citizen deserves to be judged-on the basis of abilityand to be rewarded as every citizen deserves to be rewarded-on the
basis of merit.' Handicap qua handicap is an unlawful foundation on
which to differentiate among potential participants.' Handicap alone,

however, will not entitle an individual to the protection of the statute:
Section 504 expressly requires that the individual be "otherwise quali-

fied" in order to invoke the section's antidiscrimination enforcement
mechanisms.9

4. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to
mean that the "mere possession of a handicap" is an impermissible basis for discrimination. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
6. See id.§§ 701, 794. Equal opportunity can be analyzed under two different paradigms: equal treatment, which requires evaluation by objective rules and neutral standards, or equal impact, which treats as presumptively discriminatory behavior or policy
that has an adverse impact on the protected group. See Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on
Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1003-08 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Legal Evasiveness]. The content to be given to the guarantee of equal opportunity depends on
which paradigm is chosen. See id.; see also U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities 69 (1983) ("Setting this goal [of integrating
handicapped persons into society], of course, does not mandate the means of its accomplishment") [hereinafter cited as Spectrum]. The Supreme Court has described § 504 as
mandating "evenhanded treatment," Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 410-11 (1979), but it has also indicated a willingness to entertain claims arising
under the section when a recipient's behavior has disparate effects on handicapped persons, see Alexander v. Choate, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720 (1985).
7. Merit has traditionally been the standard upon which judgments and rewards are
based. See Fallon, To Each According to His Ability, From None According to His Race:
The Concept of Merit in the Law of Antidiscrimination,60 B.U.L. Rev. 815, 815 (1980)
("There is an implicit recognition of the claims of individual merit in the liberal theory of
equality of opportunity."). Merit has been described as an "essentially contested concept," id. at 822 n.30; see Gallie,Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc. of the Aristotellian Soc'y 167, 167-68 (1956), because it is both descriptive and evaluative. Although
merit is accordingly both objective and subjective, this duality should not'pose an obstacle to its use as a standard of evaluation for claims arising under § 504. Among possible
standards, merit is the one that most nearly describes the statutory purpose of equal
opportunity. See D. Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society 425-26 (1973) (principle
of equal opportunity precludes allocating employment positions by means "other than
fair competition open equally to talent and ambition"). Although merit is the evaluative
standard used for federally funded employment and post-secondary education programs
in the framework of this Note, ability and merit will generally have no relevance in federally funded service programs. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
8. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The HHS regulations give the following definition for a
"qualified handicapped person":
(1) With respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in question;
(2) With respect to public preschool elementary, secondary, or adult educa-
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In recognition of the special problems faced by handicapped persons,
the regulations promulgated under section 504 by the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) have imposed on federal grantees the
duty of reasonable accommodation. 1" This duty is intended to remove
obstacles that might otherwise prevent able performance or effective partional services, a handicappped [sic] person (i) of an age during which nonhandicapped persons are provided such services, (ii) of any age during which it
is mandatory under state law to provide such services to handicapped persons,
or (iii) to whom a state is required to provide a free appropriate public education under Section 612 of the Education of the Handicapped Act; and
(3) With respect to postsecondary and vocational education services, a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical standards requisite to
admission or participation in the recipient's education program or activity;
(4) With respect to other services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of such services.
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1984).
HHS' analysis of its regulations explains that the word "otherwise" was omitted in the
regulations, although it appears in the statute, because
read literally, "otherwise" qualified handicapped persons include persons who
are qualified except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap.
Under such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the qualifications for
driving a bus except sight could be said to be "otherwise qualified" for the job of
driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by Congress. In all other respects, the terms "qualified" and "otherwise qualified" are intended to be
interchangeable.
45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A, at 304 (1984).
This analysis improperly excludes from consideration any accommodation that would
permit a handicapped person to become qualified. In using an improbable examplepermitting a blind person to drive-this analysis obscures the real import of the Rehabilitation Act: that a handicap can be a surmountable obstacle. A proper application of the
Act's spirit would seem to require an imagination sensitive to the limitless possibilities
medical science offers. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412
(1979). It would therefore be appropriate for the analysis to mention that a blind person
is unqualified to drive not because he is blind, but because he is not able to navigate
safely, even with reasonable accommodation. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying
text.
One commentator has identified two paradigms for the interpretation of "otherwise
qualified": equal treatment, which would require a handicapped person to be as qualified
as a nonhandicapped person, and equal impact, which would interpret "otherwise qualified" to mean qualified except for the handicap. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at
1003, 1006. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the latter construction and instead
has interpreted the language "otherwise qualified [handicapped] person" to mean "one
who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Davis, 442
U.S. at 406 (emphasis added). This rejection of the "except for" interpretation, see id.,
coupled with the Supreme Court's implicit adoption of an "evenhanded treatment" standard, see id. at 410-12, lends support to the equal treatment paradigm. See also Alexander v. Choate, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720 (1985) (rejecting "boundless notion that all disparateimpact showings constitute prima facie cases under § 504").
10. The duty of accommodation differs with each program. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12
(employment practices); id. § 84.22 (program accessibility); id. § 84.44 (postsecondary
education); id. § 84.52 (health, welfare and other social services). A recent government
publication has defined reasonable accommodation as "providing or modifying devices,
services, or facilities or changing practices or procedures in order to match a particular
person with a particular program or activity. Individualizing opportunities is this definition's essence." Spectrum, supra note 6, at 102.
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ticipation by handicapped persons.II The Supreme Court has accepted
this requirement to the extent that it facilitates "evenhanded treatment of
qualified handicapped persons." 2
Neither the statute nor the regulations, however, provides a scheme
from which federal grantees and courts can discern the extent of the nondiscrimination/reasonable accommodation obligation. 3 The responsibility for implementing and enforcing this obligation has thus fallen by
default on the judiciary."4 In the absence of a comprehensive model, the
courts' focus has been blurred and their decisions nonuniform.' 5 As a
result, claims brought under section 504 are often dismissed without a
full consideration of the substantive issues. 16
11. The term "reasonable accommodation" originally referred only to employment
practices that enhanced the employability of handicapped applicants or employees. See
Spectrum, supra note 6, at 104-05. It has come to mean any modification a court may
impose on a recipient's program that permits the participation of handicapped persons.
See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979).
12. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979); see also
Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 721 (1985) ("to assure meaningful access [to federally funded programs], reasonable accommodations. . . may have to be made").
13. In an often cited outcry against the exasperating lack of guidance provided to
courts and federal recipients, one court, presented with a case involving public transportation, lamented:
How plain is the language of. .. § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act? What
must be done to provide handicapped persons with the same right to utilize
mass transportation facilities as other persons? Does each bus have to have
special capacity? Must each seat on each bus be removable? Must the bus
routes be changed to provide stops at all hospitals, therapy centers and nursing
homes? Is it required that buses be able to accommodate bedridden persons? Is
it discriminatory to answer any of these questions in the negative? Will the
operation of hydraulic lifts on buses involve stigmatizing effects on the persons
who use them? If so, is that a discrimination solely by reason of handicap
within the meaning of § 504?
Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Colo. 1978); see Rhode
Island Handicapped Action Comm. v. Rhode Island Pub. Transit Auth., 718 F.2d 490,
494 (1st Cir. 1983) ("Because it is both ambiguous and lacking in specifics its scope and
effect have been an enigma since section 504 was enacted."); Legal Evasiveness,supra note
6, at 999 ("The [section's] indeterminate language devolves responsibility for policy
choice on courts. . . .As a result of this congressional default, handicapped persons and
their actual or potential employers remain without meaningful legal guidelines for
interaction.").
14. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 999.
15. Compare Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332, 342 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (when blind
applicant is not otherwise qualified, employer need not consider reasonable accommodation nor hire an aide) with Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 375-82 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (when blind employees require reasonable accommodation to be qualified, such
accommodation must be provided by federal grantee when associated cost does not constitute undue hardship), aff'd mem., 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cerL denied, 105 S.Ct.
955 (1985).
16. For example, in employment discrimination cases, some courts have dismissed
claims when the program's primary objective was not employment. See, eg., Scanlon v.
Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 104 S.Ct. 1583
(1984); United States v. Cabrini Medical Center, 639 F.2d 908, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1981);
Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 (8th Cir.), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehab. Center, Inc.,,590 F.2d 87, 89-90 (4th
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The Supreme Court has indicated that a comprehensive scheme must
balance the remedial purposes of section 504 against the possibility of a

boundless application of the section.

7

Recognizing that a federally

funded program has a legitimate interest in preserving its "integrity, ' "'
the Court has concluded that not all differentiation based on the presence
of a handicap is prohibited by the Act. 9 A federal grantee's duty to
accommodate a handicapped individual may therefore be limited by the
program's need to achieve the purposes for which it was established.20
This Note will present an approach to section 504 claims that permits
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947 (1979). The Supreme Court has held this requirement to be inappropriate for § 504 claims. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104
S. Ct. 1248, 1255 (1984).
Lower education cases are now commonly dismissed on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984), in which the Court ruled
that the rights and remedies of a more specific statute-there the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1411-1420 (1982)-are exclusive, and that in such
cases resort to the Rehabilitation Act is unavailable. Smith, 104 S. Ct. at 3473-74.
A major procedural obstacle to the plaintiff's case is the allocation of burden of proof.
This issue has often been analyzed according to a three-part model fashioned after McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), a case arising under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Under this model a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case, at which time the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate reason for its behavior; the plaintiff is then given an opportunity to
rebut the defendant's proof as a mere pretext. See Comment, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment DiscriminationClaims, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 867, 891
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims]; see, e.g.,
Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1249-50 (6th Cir. 1985); Norcross v.
Sneed, 755 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1985); Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991, 992-93 (9th Cir.
1985); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981); Pushkin v. Regents of
Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981). The dispute over the ultimate
burdens of proof and persuasion, see Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims,
supra, at 891-98, is beyond the scope of this Note.
Procedural models that require the plaintiff to show as part of his prima facie case that
lie is otherwise qualified "apartfrom his or her handicap," id. at 894 (emphasis in original), make consideration of accommodations difficult, if not impossible. Courts often do
not permit the plaintiff to introduce the vital issue of available accommodations until
after he has proven his prima facie case--even though it will often be impossible for a
claimant to show he is otherwise qualified "apart from his handicap" without taking
appropriate accommodations into account. See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Comm., 704 F.2d 1402, 1408 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Upshur v. Love,
474 F. Supp. 332, 342 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (when applicant characterized as not otherwise
qualified, employer "not obligated to consider what 'reasonable accommodation' would
be called for").
17. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985); see also Legal Evasiveness,
supra note 6, at 1008 (rejecting criterion of ability gives rise to "conceptually boundless"
interpretation of § 504).
18. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985).
19. See id. (rejecting "boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings constitute
prima facie cases under § 504").
20. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 411-12 (1979)
(rejecting interpretation of § 504 as requiring modifications that would fundamentally
alter nature of program); see also Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985) ("Davis
thus struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be integrated
into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of
the programs. .. ").
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a federal grantee to preserve its program's integrity.2 ' Such claims
should be subject to a two-step analysis: First, a court must ensure that

its finding of unlawful discrimination does not subvert a program's legitimate interest in considering ability or quality of performance in its decisionmaking process when these concerns are relevant.' Second, the cost
of complying with the section cannot be so prohibitive that the program

is unable to carry out its purpose. 3 The analysis posited by this Note
focuses on two concerns left unresolved by the statute, legislative history,

and regulations: that, unlike the case presented by other classes protected by discrimination law, the condition that triggers the protection of

the statute may raise concerns of ability relevant in the decisionmaking

process.2 4 Moreover, compliance with the nondiscrimination mandate

via accommodation can result in considerable cost, to the detriment of
21. This Note is not intended as an introduction or primer on the law under § 504;
rather, it is intended to synthesize the present state of the law into a comprehensive and
predictable analysis. For a complete discussion of the background and case law under
§ 504, see Wegner, The AntidiscriminationModel Reconsidered:EnsuringEqual Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct of 1973, 69
Cornell L. Rev. 401 (1984).
22. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 & n.12 (1979).
When quality or ability concerns are subverted in such a situation, the integrity of the
program is undermined. See infra notes 101-05, 167-84 and accompanying text.
23. See Note, Accommodating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination
UnderSection 504 ofthe RehabilitationAct, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 881, 900-02 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Meaning ofDiscrimination];see also Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712,
725 (1985) (administrative costs associated with required accommodations exceed statutory mandate); cf Wegner, supra note 21, at 479 (recognizing "cost-plus defense" when
defendant demonstrates either "incapacity to bear the costs of accommodation" or "inadequacy of benefits received in light of costs incurred"). When the cost of complying with
§ 504 is so great that it impairs the program's ability to function, it constitutes undue
hardship. See infra notes 151-66, 185-91, 196-99 and accompanying text.
24. See Letter from Richard F. Schubert, for the Secretary of Labor, to Sen. Harrison
A. Williams, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare (Sept. 24, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Letter], reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6431, 6434; Gittler, FairEmployment and the Handicapped:A Legal Perspective,27 De Paul L. Rev. 953,
967 (1978); Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 883. Although § 504 was "intended to be part of the general corpus of discrimination law," New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979); see S. Rep. No. 1297,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6373, 6390-91;
Wegner, supra note 21, at 426-28; Legal Evasiveness,supra note 6, at 1008, the application of Title VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to § 504 is not a smooth one,
and has been described as "akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole," Garrity v.
Galen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981); see Spectrum, supra note 6, at 142; Letter,
supra, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6431, 6434. Acknowledging that
program recipients may in fact be justified in taking an applicant's handicap into account,
one observer noted that "[r]ace and sex are generally discernible factors unrelated to job
qualifications. Physical and mental disabilities, however, are frequently undiscernible
and their degree is relevant to whether or not an applicant may be employable and in
what capacity." Id., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6431, 6434. The
relevance of the handicapping condition in determining participation is evident not only
with respect to job qualifications, but also with respect to post-secondary education qualifications, see Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979), and
service program eligibility requirements, see infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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the recipient's program.2 5
Evaluating a claim of discrimination 26 brought by a handicapped person can be performed properly by focusing on the nature of the program
in which it arises.2 7 These programs occur in three broad contexts: 28 (1)
employment; 29 (2) post-secondary education; 30 and (3) preschool, elementary and secondary education, a" and health, welfare and social services (services).3 2 These contexts are distinguished by the degree to which
the programs are dominated by concerns of performance and service.
Consequently, in each context a different standard for determining unlawful behavior should be applied.
Part I of this Note presents an integrity-of-the-program test and examines its origin and design. It proposes definitions for each type of program within the test's ambit and explains that the specific content of the
test is determined by the context of the claim. Part II applies the test to
those definitions and concludes that employment programs should be
subject to a less strict accommodation requirement than are post-secondary education programs, and that of the three, service programs should
be subject to the greatest accommodation requirement.
25. See Meaningof Discrimination,supra note 23, at 889 ("[s]ection 504 was enacted

originally with little consideration of the duties it imposed or the cost of compliance," yet
the nondiscrimination mandate results in "potentially costly accommodation efforts").
26. Examination of the procedural issues implicated by such claims-notably, which
party must prove the elements of the test and to what degree-is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a discussion of the allocation of burdens under section 504 in employment
discrimination claims, see Analyzing Employment DiscriminationClaims, supra note 16,

at 891-98.
27. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.12, .22, .44 (1984) (differentiating among various
types of programs and describing different accommodation requirements for each). The
nondiscrimination mandate of § 504 precludes use of a single interpretative approach for
all the programs the section covers because of the varying natures of such programs. This
Note proposes a comprehensive model that considers each program individually under an
integrity-of-the-program test. Other models focus on the type of banned behavior, see
Wegner, supra note 21, at 405, or on the burdens faced by handicapped claimants, see
Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 897-900. Neither model sufficiently illuminates the conflict between the statutory objectives and the preservation of the integrity of
the recipient's programs. The program-oriented approach posited here focuses the analysis on the tension identified by the Supreme Court's decisions in Davis and Alexander.
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
28. The contexts described in this Note are those identified by the HHS regulations.
See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1984). The regulations also identify Program Accessibility as an
issue of interest under § 504, see id. at §§ 84.21-.23, but this area involves physical and
architectural barriers that arise within one of the other contexts, and as such would be
subject to the analysis appropriate to the context in which it arises. As a practical matter,
the three contexts described are the only ones in which litigation under § 504 has arisen
to date.
29. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-.14 (1984).
30. See id. §§ 84.41-.47.
31. See id. §§ 84.31-.39.
32. See id. §§ 84.5 1-.55. Because of the conceptual similarities between lower education programs and service programs, this Note will analyze them as a unit.
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A PRINCIPLED LIMITATION ON DISCRIMINATION: PRESERVING
THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROGRAM

A.

Overview

The test of the lawfulness of allegedly discriminatory behavior should

be whether the preservation of the integrity of the grantee's program re-

quires the behavior.3 3 The Supreme Court implied such a test when it
recognized "a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to
be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees
in preserving the integrity of their programs." 34 The test would properly
focus attention on "the two powerful but countervailing considerations" 35 that arise when interpreting the nondiscrimination mandate: the

remedial objectives of the section and
the need to avoid the boundless
36
implementation of those objectives.

There are compelling reasons for using this test. First, it would protect victims of discriminatory policies from having otherwise meritorious

claims dismissed simply because the recipient's possibly spurious defense

of necessity survives a rational basis level of scrutiny. 37 The proposed

integrity test would require courts to extend the inquiry into the challenged behavior beyond the search for a rational basis; thus, a recipient

will not be permitted to act in an ostensibly rational manner if such
action is38discriminatory and does not preserve the integrity of its

program.

Second, by balancing the interests of handicapped persons against the

recipients' interest in protecting the integrity of their programs, this test
33. This test is derived from the need recognized by the Supreme Court to balance the
statutory objectives and the preservation of federally funded programs. See Alexander v.

Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 413 & n.12 (1979). The test gives effect to this balance of interests by accepting or
rejecting the legitimacy of an interest that the grantee holds out as deserving of preservation. The Department of Justice has recently promulgated regulations that reflect the
integrity test suggested by Davis. See Enforcement of Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Handicap in Federally Conducted Programs, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,724, 35,724-39 (1984) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 39).
34. Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985).
35. Id.

36. See id.; Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-1.3 (1979).
37. For examples of courts invoking a rational basis level of scrutiny, see Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1412 (5th Cir.
1983); Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981); Kampmeier v. Nyquist,
553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977); Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 114 (W.D. Va.
1981). It is not clear whether the defenses interposed by the defendants in these cases
were spurious or not, because in each case the court did not inquire further once it discerned a rational basis for the defendants' decision. See Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, supra note 16, at 888-91; see also Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716
F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983) (criticizing rational basis test).
38. See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983); Pushkin
v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th Cir. 1981); Simon v. St. Louis
County, 656 F.2d 316, 320 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 976 (1982); Analyzing
Employment DiscriminationClaims, supra note 16, at 886-91.
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provides the manageability necessary to avoid the potentially boundless
obligations that a different interpretation of section 504 might impose.3 9
Because the duties under section 504 would arise only when they do not
undermine the integrity of the recipient's program, this test alleviates the
danger of uncontrolled and unpredictable applications of the section.40
The grantee may preserve the integrity of the program because section
504 does not embrace an affirmative action requirement 4' and does not
prohibit recipients from taking disability into account in their
decisionmaking.4 2
Under an integrity-of-the-program test, handicap-based differentiation
would not be unlawful if no level of accommodation would qualify a
handicapped person for participation in the program.43 Similarly, even if
the person can qualify with accommodation, a refusal to accommodate
would not be unlawful if the associated cost is such that the program is
unable to perform its organizational purpose. 44 It is essential to a fair
implementation of the section that considerations of quality and cost be
kept distinct. 45 If these considerations become overly entwined, the in39. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985); Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979); see also Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at
1010 (limiting principle must balance equal treatment and equal impact paradigms).
40. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 1008 ("[The equal effects] paradigm evokes
fears of tremendous social costs: potentially unlimited investments in special equipment,
massive industrial reorganization, loss of workplace efficiency, and increased safety
risks."). A particularly short-sighted enforcement of a state nondiscrimination law pertaining to the handicapped involved a blind applicant for a school's playground supervisor position. See Zorick v. Tynes, 372 So. 2d 133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The court
held that the nondiscrimination duty of the statute required the school to employ the
applicant on a trial basis until he was proven not to be otherwise qualified-presumably
when the school's concerns for the safety of the children were borne out. See id. at 142.
41. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-11 (1979) (if
Congress intended § 504 to have an affirmative action requirement, it would have expressly provided one). Compare 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (contains no affirmative action
requirement) with id. §§ 791(b), 793(a) (contains affirmative action requirement).
42. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979) ("Section 504 by its terms does not compel [a federally funded program] to disregard the
disabilities of handicapped individuals . . . to allow disabled persons to participate [in
their programs]."); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (affording protection only to "otherwise qualified handicapped individual[s]").
43. See infra notes 128-34, 178-84 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 149-66, 185-91, 196-99 and accompanying text.
45. The HHS regulations fail to make clear this distinction. The regulations indicate
that a handicapped person is "qualified" for the purpose of invoking the protections of
the statute if he can perform the essential functions of the job with the aid of "reasonable" accommodations. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1984). The regulation's use of the
qualifier "reasonable" introduces considerations of cost, see id. § 84.12(c)(3) (accommodations are reasonable unless they inflict "undue hardship" on program), that are inappropriate to whether a handicapped person is qualified for the job.
Although there is some cost involved in any sacrifice of ability, see Legal Evasiveness,
supra note 6, at 1012, this cost must be considered independently. If considerations of
cost are permitted to influence the quality inquiry, invariably quality can be found to
have suffered, and the goal of preserving quality would reduce § 504 to a nullity. When
cost is entirely excluded from the quality inquiry, quality can be preserved and a court
can then focus on what costs Congress intended federal grantees to incur.
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quiry loses its focus and neither federal recipients nor handicapped persons receives any guidance concerning rights and obligations under the
section.

Although the test proposed here proceeds against the background
principle that the program's integrity must be preserved, each of the
three types of programs-employment; post-secondary education; and
services-requires a separate analysis." The specific inquiry in the employment context should be a two-step process to determine, first,
whether a putative employee is qualified in light of appropriate accommodations; and second, whether such accommodations constitute undue

hardship.47 In the post-secondary education context, the two-step process should determine, first, whether the applicant is qualified for admission after balancing the program's interest in admitting the best qualified
applicants against the service aspects of the program and evaluating the
applicant in light of appropriate accommodations; and second, whether
the cost associated with the accommodations constitutes undue hard-

ship.4

In the services context, the inquiry should determine, first,

whether the handicapped claimant is entitled to the benefits he seeks; and
second, whether accommodation constitutes undue hardship.4 9 The operative concepts-"qualified" and "undue hardship"- will gain content

by evaluating them on the basis of the integrity of the program

involved. 0
The integrity test acquires much of its substantive effect when the relevant program is defined."' Vital issues of policy suggest a myriad of pos-

sible definitions;

2

courts must be aware that their definition of the

46. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
47. See infra Pt. II.A. The inquiry described here is similar to a model suggested by
another commentator. See Comment, Employment Discrimination-AnalyzingHandicap
DiscriminationClaims: The Right Toolsfor the Job, 62 N.C.L. Rev. 535, 537 n. 15 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as The Right Tools for the Job]. This linear model permits the best
effectuation of the integrity test because it permits consideration of accommodation and
separates the quality and cost issues.
48. See infra Pt. II.B.
49. See infra Pt. II.C.
50. The regulations recognize that the meaning of these terms will vary according to
the program in which they arise. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k), 84.12(a), (c) (1984). The
terms "qualified" and "undue" are notions that must refer to a context, that is, "qualified
for something" and "undue because of something." It would therefore be meaningless to
give them content outside the context of a particular program. See Meaning of Discrimination, supra note 23, at 900-01 (the meaning of undue hardship must be determined in
reference to its effect on particular program).
51. See, eg., Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 722 (1985) (defining medicare program as "a particular package of health care services" instead of "'adequate health
care'" permitted state program to limit in-hospital patient coverage); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 1983) (defining goal of school bus driver
licensing program as the prevention of appreciable risks to passenger safety rather than
the elimination of all risks).
52. The interests of "social integration, efficiency, personal dignity, merit, freedom,
and equality," see Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 1015, coalesce in different proportions in formulating a definition of these programs.
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program will embrace a particular vision of society.53 Until Congress
supplies statutory definitions of the types of programs subject to section
504, 54 courts must exercise great care in imposing their own definitions.
B. Defining the Program
1. Employment Programs
A definition of the employment program should identify those employer interests that must be protected to maintain the integrity of the
program. Under the proposed test, the interests excluded from the definition may be sacrificed to further the interests of the remedial purposes
of the section.
An employer requires discretion to decide whom to employ.5 5 This
discretion is particularly important when evaluating both the require56
ments of a job and the ability of candidates to meet those requirements.

Ability is always measured against the task: An individual with proven
skills in one area may be ill-equipped in another.

7

If an employer is

53. See id. at 999. This Note chooses merit as the evaluative standard for effectuating
the statutory vision of equal opportunity. Contrary views as to policy may interpret differently the vision intended by the statute; this Note merely proposes a framework to
permit these considerations of policy and suggests a particular vision.
54. A congressional definition preempts judicial scrutiny into such a definition. See
Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 722 (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (1984); cf. Smith v.
Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3473-74 (1984) (judicial construction of legislative intent of
Education of All Handicapped Children Act determines rights and remedies available
under public lower education program to the exclusion of rights and remedies available
under § 504). The enactment of precise statutory definitions of employment, post-secondary education and service programs might therefore resolve much of the confusion and
controversy involved in enforcing the nondiscrimination mandate of § 504.
55. See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d
1402, 1410 (5th Cir. 1983); cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46
(1937) (recognizing strong element of employer discretion in union discrimination cases);
Paramount Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 631 F.2d 346, 348 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Sioux
Quality Packers v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 153, 156 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); Note, Discriminatory Discharge in a Sports Context A Reassessment of the Burden of Proofand Remedies
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 615, 615 & n.2 (1984)
(discussing importance of employer discretion in sports context).
56. See, e.g., Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d
1402, 1410, 1412 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding employer's subjective judgment that applicant could not satisfy job requirement of emotional stability); cf.Doe v. New York Univ.,
666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing importance of subjective evaluative criteria
in post-secondary education). Business necessity is an acceptable basis for employment
decisions. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, %16, at 308 (1984).
57. One court gave a particularly colorful and convincing summation of this point:
Most citizens would be handicapped in playing baseball as compared to Carl
Yastrzemski, in singing as compared to Beverly Sills, in abstract thinking as
compared to Albert Einstein, and in the development of a sense of humor as
compared to Woody Allen. Human talent takes many forms, and within each
talent is a continuum of achievement. While one individual might be on the
high end of the scale of achievement in one area, that same individual might
rank very low in another area. Woody Allen will probably never win the Triple
Crown, and Carl Yastrzemski is not likely to perform "Aida." In sum, the
identification of various gradations of handicap is not an easy task, especially if
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deprived of his freedom to determine on the basis of ability who is qualified to perform designated tasks, the notion of employer discretion is potentially reduced to a nullity. 8

Of course, this discretion should not be boundless. Courts must recognize that under section 504 there are impermissible grounds for rejecting
a job applicant,59 and that it is their duty to guard against unlawful discrimination." For example, an employer may not reject a handicapped

applicant because he fears the public's reaction to the applicant's condition.

1

Nevertheless, it is still provident to include in the definition of

employment an element accounting for the employer discretion6' n-ces-

sary to satisfy legitimate concerns. 3
The employment program will be defined here as the performance of
tasks in a manner consistent with the employer's legitimate expectation of
benefits from the successful completion of those tasks. Under this definition, unlawful discrimination will be present when acts or decisions discriminate on the basis of one's handicap and do not serve to protect the
quality of performance or expected benefits.
It could be argued that employment confers a benefit not only to the
such is attempted in a vacuum. Assessing the capability of various individuals
to perform without knowledge of the particular task under consideration and its
various requirements, or without an individualized determination of their
strengths and weaknesses would appear to be impossible.
Garrity v. Galen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981).
58. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 1008 ("If inability to perform ...

is not a

valid basis for exclusion from employment, what basis is valid? Must employers distribute jobs by lot?").
59. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 622-23 (9th Cir.
1982) (spurious job criterion that employee maintain blood sugar below specified level);
Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th Cir. 1981) (improper
speculation that applicant was emotionally unstable); see also Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567
F. Supp. 369, 379-82 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (refusal to provide reasonable accommodation to
otherwise qualified handicapped person), aff'd mem., 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S.CL 955 (1985).
60. The level of scrutiny a court should give to employment discrimination claims
under § 504 is unsettled. Compare Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231
(3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting rational basis standard, which requires "factual basis ... reasonably demonstrating" that conduct was not discriminatory) and Pushkin v. Regents of
Univ. of Clo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383-87 (10th Cir. 1981) (rejecting rational basis standard
and adopting series of burdens procedure) with Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d 1402, 1412 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying "reasonable justification" test) and Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying
"reasonable basis" test). See Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, supra note

16, at 884-91.
61. See Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387, 1390 (10th Cir.
1981) (defendants' fear of patients' reactions to residency program applicant's condition
of multiple sclerosis not permissible basis for rejecting applicant). In such a situation, the
expectation of the employer-to have employees who do not offend the public-should
not be considered legitimate.
62. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 121. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
63. The use of the qualifier "legitimate" permits a court to reduce or eliminate employer discretion concerning impermissible grounds for rejection. For examples of impermissible employment criteria, see supra note 59.
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employer, but in the social setting also to the employee, and that its relation to section 504 should account for this social benefit.' This view,

however, would lead to unmanageable consequences because it would require an employer to make the employment decision not in terms of his
expected benefits,65 but rather in terms of the provision of opportunities
to the population at large.6 6 The employer under such circumstances
would be unable to fill a position without impinging on the "rights" of
every other potential employee.6 7 Moreover, such a view is contrary to

the notion of the job market as a meritocracy:68 A job is earned, not

granted.6 9 In the absence of an affirmative action requirement,70 it is
more reasonable to view the ends of employment in terms of the benefits
expected by the employer.
2.

Post-Secondary Education Programs

A definition of post-secondary education programs should encompass
two sometimes competing interests: the student's performance in the

course of study71 and the school's provision of educational opportunity

and services.72
Quality performance serves two important interests: It protects and
enhances the school's reputation7 3 and it assures potential employers that
64. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 1014-15.
65. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 121, 127.
66. See Fallon, supra note 7, at 831-34 (discussing alternatives to merit distribution).
67. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 1008.
68. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
69. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 121 ("[N]o handicapped person is entitled to a
particular job; nondiscrimination merely means that handicapped people may not be rejected solely because of their handicaps.").
70. Courts and commentators have criticized the Davis Court's confusion of "affirmative action" with "affirmative efforts." See Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652
(2d Cir. 1982); Note, Accommodating the Handicapped:RehabilitatingSection 504 After
Southeastern, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 171, 185-86 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Accommodating
the Handicapped];Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 885-86. The Court clarified its language by equating affirmative action not required by the section with substantial modifications that cause the integrity of the program to suffer. See Alexander v.
Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 721 & n.20 (1985).
71. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (applicant must meet program's requirements for performing in course of study); Doe v. New
York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1981) (same).
72. See 29 U.S.C. § 723(a)(3) (1982) (post-secondary education treated as vocational
rehabilitation service); Accommodating the Handicapped,supra note 70, at 179 & n.55
(post-secondary education is important in the rehabilitation process). Although this aspect is absent in the employment context, see supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text, it
is an important aspect of post-secondary education. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
73. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981). A post-secondary
educational institution is frequently evaluated by published sources on the basis of its
student body's past academic achievements and standarized test scores. See generally E.
Epstein, J. Shostak & L. Troy, Barron's Guide to Law Schools (5th ed. 1983) (directory
of American law schools providing such evaluative data). For a general and candid discussion of the undergraduate admissions process and its relation to the school's reputation, see generally Ledger, The Application Stops Here, 84 Pa. Gazette 30 (Mar. 1985).
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graduates have a particular level of competence.7 4 In order to preserve

these interests, the definition of the program should allow significant discretion in the admissions process. 7 1 Making available post-secondary education, however, is a necessary responsibility of these institutions,
because of their role in facilitating the integration of handicapped per-

sons into the mainstream of society.76 Thus, while institutions should be

permitted discretion to make admission decisions on the basis of performance, this discretion must be tempered to preserve the strong societal policy that educational opportunities and services be provided to
handicapped persons as part of the rehabilitative process. 7 The definition of a post-secondary education program should therefore guide
courts in resolving the tension between these competing interests.
There are strong reasons for preferring the performance interests when
they conflict with the service interests. The value of a post-secondary

education is largely derived from the credibility attached to the degree or

certification that the school confers.7 8 When performance is compromised, this credibility suffers.79 As a result, potential employers are less
able to rely on a graduate's degree, schools are less able to maintain the

reputation on which their continued existence depends, and graduateshandicapped and nonhandicapped alike-find the value of their achieve-

ment diluted and subject to question. The risk of such a result overshadows the interest in public access to post-secondary education and would

in fact undermine that interest. In the absence of an affirmative action
mandate," section 504 should not be read to produce such a result.
The Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. DavisII indicated that the performance aspects of post-secondary education programs should take precedence.8 2 The Court found no violation of section

504 when the applicant to a nursing program, who suffered from a seri74. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 n. 12 (1979); see
also Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C.
1976) ("it is completely reasonable and logical for the state to limit enrollment to such
persons as are able to meet professional qualifications upon graduation"), aff'd in part
vacated in part, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
75. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981) ("considerable
judicial deference must be paid to the evaluation made by the institution"); cf. Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1977) ("[t]he freedom of a university to make
its own judgment as to education includes the selection of its student body") (plurality
opinion of Powell, J.); Martin v. Helstad, 578 F. Supp. 1473, 1482 (W.D. Wis. 1983)
("Academic institutions are accorded great deference in their freedom to determine who
may be admitted to study at the institution.").
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 723(a)(3) (1982) (post-secondary education treated as vocational
rehabilitation service); Accommodating the Handicapped,supra note 70, at 179 & n.55
(post-secondary education is important in the rehabilitation process).
77. See Accommodating the Handicapped,supra note 70, at 179.
78. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 & n.12 (1979).
79. See id.
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
82. See id. at 410, 413 & n.12.
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ous hearing disability, was denied admission because she could not have
successfully performed all the relevant tasks required in the course of
study. 3 In the Court's view, excusing the applicant from the tasks she
could not have performed would produce a "fundamental alteration in
the nature of the program." 84 Accordingly, the school did not unlawfully discriminate against the applicant in refusing to admit and subsequently accommodate her."
The service aspect of educational
outweigh
the
school's performance concerns.8 6 If it
opportunity did not
had, the Court would have ordered the school to admit the student
notwithstanding the diminished quality of performance.
Because it is necessary both to preserve performance and service interests and to recognize the priority of performance concerns, the definition
of the post-secondary education program should be the provision of educationalopportunities and services in a manner that does not reduce the
quality ofperformance of the tasks involved in the course of study. Under
this definition, unlawful discrimination will be present when acts or decisions discriminate on the basis of handicap and do not protect performance and service interests.
3. Preschool, Elementary and Secondary Education, and Health,
Welfare and Social Services
These programs have been grouped together here because they share
the common feature that performance by beneficiaries is generally not a
requirement for participation in the program. 7 The nature of these programs depends on the services provided and the intended beneficiaries.
Defining these two elements is a prerequisite to formulating a definition of the program, but it is a difficult task because in most instances
these programs involve the distribution of limited resources" and because defining the services and beneficiaries will determine how that allo83. See id. at 409-10.
84. Id. at 410.
85. Id. at 414.
86. See id. at 410, 413.
87. Lower education, as distinguished from post-secondary education, is entirely a
service oriented program; an integrity-of-the-program test should therefore proceed the
same way for these programs as for health, welfare and social service programs. An
arguable exception to the lack of a performance requirement occurs in lower education
programs, which are permitted to place students according to their demonstrated ability.
See, e.g., Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1012 (1983); Parents in Action on Special Educ. v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 831, 883
(N.D. Ill. 1980). Nonperformance by the student does not bar him from participating in
the service---education; rather, he is prevented from obtaining a particular benefit-a regular classroom setting. In this case, performance is more properly viewed as an eligibility
requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 205-06. It must be noted that the continuing vitality of § 504 claims in the lower education setting is currently in doubt in light
of Smith v. Robinson, 104 S.Ct. 3457 (1984), which held that the Rehabilitation Act's
remedies are unavailable when a more specific statutory scheme provides a remedy. Id.
at 3473-74.
88. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S.Ct. 712, 725 (1985) (the allocation of medicaid
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cation will proceed. 9 In effect, the courts are determining the potential
beneficiaries of the pie and the size of their slices. This is properly a
legislative function, 90 but when Congress is silent the courts must supply
that determination.
In the services context, a distinction should be made between the serv-

ices to be provided and the particular benefits offered to beneficiaries.
The services, as defined in this Note, are of a general character: They are

the goals and purposes of the program. The benefits, as defined here, are
merely the means by which the services are rendered. The services must

be maintained if the integrity of the program is to be preserved; the particular benefits, however, can and should be altered when necessary to
fulfill the nondiscrimination mandate of section 504.91
The discretion to determine the specific package of benefits may be
conferred upon the federal grantee by statute. 92 When Congress ex-

pressly provides for such discretion, there is no need for courts to scrutinize the grantee's determination of the particular benefits provided even
benefits is a "broad based distributive decision"); Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644,
647 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing fund allocation procedures for public transit programs).
89. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 722 (1985) (by defining services as particular benefits to be determined by state, court permitted state to decrease in-hospital
medicaid coverage); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565,
1567-68 (11th Cir. 1983) (by defining lower education program as free education serving
particular needs of handicapped children, year-round services are required when appropriate), vacated on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3581 (1984).

90. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 722 (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (1984).
Under the heading "Programs limited by Federal law," the H-S regulations observe:
The exclusion of nonhandicapped persons from the benefits of a program limited by Federal statute or executive order to handicapped persons or the exclusion of a specific class of handicapped persons from a program limited by
Federal statute or executive order to a different class of handicapped persons is
not prohibited ....
Id.

91. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 721 (1985). Distinguishing the benefits
of a service program from its goals or purposes is not always a simple matter. In fact, the
Supreme Court in Alexander had some difficulty making this distinction. Tennessee had
reduced its medicaid in-hospital coverage from twenty to fourteen days per year. Alexander, 105 S. Ct. at 715. This action was alleged to violate § 504 on the grounds that it had
a discriminatory effect on handicapped beneficiaries. Id. The Court recognized that
"[tihe benefit itself... cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled." Id. at
721. But see id. at 725 (grantee need not alter its benefits even if doing so would achieve
program's objectives and permit greater participation by handicapped persons). The
Court further determined, however, that the intended beneficiaries are entitled not to
broadly conceived "adequate health care," but to a narrowly conceived "particular package of health care services" that may be defined by the organization that provides themin this case, the state. See id. at 722. Such a posture could, as the Court acknowledged,
render the nondiscrimination mandate empty of meaning. See id. at 721 n.21. Although
it recognized that the Act gives the states substantial discretion to select a particular
package of benefits, id. at 722 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1982)), Alexander should
not be construed to grant broad discretion to other service programs when there is no
equivalent congressional authorization.
92. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 722 (1985); 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (1984).
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when certain groups may not be adequately served by them.9 3 The only
requirement section 504 imposes in such circumstances is that the benefits be dispensed without a denial of meaningful access.9 4 When Con-

gress is silent, however, courts must scrutinize the determination of the
benefits95 and should alter them if doing so permits handicapped persons
to participate and does not undermine the ability of the program to
function.9 6
The intended beneficiaries of the program must also be identified.
When Congress expressly provides a statutory definition of intended beneficiaries,97 no judicial construction is necessary or appropriate. 9 8 When
Congress is silent on the matter, however, a judicial construction-not
one provided by the grantee-should be provided to define the set of beneficiaries. 99 This construction should be one that permits the greatest

participation by handicapped persons without impairing the ability of the
program to serve other intended beneficiaries." °

The definition of the nature of these service programs should thus be
contextual: the provision of X services to Y beneficiaries. The variables
will be provided either by statute or by judicial construction. Under the
integrity-of-the-program test, a violation of section 504 will be present
when the services are provided in a discriminatory manner that is not
necessary to preserve the ability of the program to provide the services.

II.

THE DETERMINATION OF UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION:
APPLYING THE INTEGRITY TEST TO THE PROGRAM
DEFINITIONS

The process of defining federally funded programs is a crucial stage in
93. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 725 (1985). The Court indicated that
under Davis individual consideration of the needs of handicapped persons would not be
required if the cost of such consideration would be excessive. See id. This approach
meets the integrity-of-the-program test because costs that impair the ability of the program to carry out its purpose are not required. See Meaning of Discrimination,supra
note 23, at 900-02 (advocating a "program impairment" defense for § 504 claims).
When Congress provides for more specific rights and remedies in another statute, resort to § 504 is not available; thus, a § 504 scrutiny is not necessary. See Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3473-74 (1984). Relief under such circumstances must comply with
the intent of the more specific statute. Id.
94. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 721-22 (1985).
95. See id. at 721.
96. See Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 900-02.
97. For example, the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1411-1420 (1982), requires a recipient's program to include as beneficiaries handicapped children between the ages of three and twenty-one, see id. § 1412(2).
98. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (1984).
99. Just as it could be discriminatory, in the absence of a grant of discretion by Congress, to permit a grantee to define the benefits it provides, see Alexander v. Choate, 105
S. Ct. 712, 721 n.21 (1985), it could be equally discriminatory to permit the grantee to
define the beneficiaries who will receive them. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(c) (1984).
100. See Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 900-02; cf Alexander v. Choate,
105 S. Ct. 712, 721 (1985) (handicapped person must be provided meaningful access to
participation in the program).
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developing a principled and comprehensive approach to section 504, but
it remains to develop schematic models that will permit consideration of
the concepts "reasonable accommodation," "undue hardship," and
"otherwise qualified handicapped individuals" within each context.
These models will necessarily differ according to the type of program
involved because the features requiring preservation will vary.
A.

Employment Programs

The ability of a handicapped applicant to perform the job's tasks is a
relevant and legitimate concern in employment decisions;' any interpretation of section 504 that would diminish the role of ability in an employer's decisionmaking process would not only ignore the Supreme
Court's desire to permit federal recipients to preserve the integrity of
their programs 10 2 but would also misconstrue the import of the statute
itself. 10 3 Although the regulations impose a reasonable accommodation
requirement on employers," ° an affirmative action requirement implying
some compromise of standards on the part of the employer is conspicuously absent from the language of the statute."0 5 Accordingly, any interpretation of section 504 must preserve an employer's discretion to base
decisions on concerns of ability.
Two issues that are best kept distinct arise in evaluating employment
discrimination claims under section 504. The first is the issue of quality
of performance, which under the integrity-of-the-program test is considered after the appropriate accommodations to the applicant's handicap
are identified. The second, which under the test is considered only after
the accommodated applicant is determined to be qualified, addresses
whether the cost of these accommodations constitutes undue hardship on
the employer. If the applicant is not qualifed, the issue of cost should
never arise; likewise, the issue of quality should not be influenced by concerns of cost. A court should take great care not to blur the distinction
between the two issues.
1. Quality in View of Appropriate Accommodations
The issue of quality-defined here as the satisfaction of the employer's
expectation of benefits"' 6-- cannot be divorced from section 504's policy
of nondiscrimination. The statute itself extends its protection to "other101. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
102. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720 (1985); Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979). Because performance is the central element
in the employment program definition, a requirement that an employer hire less than the
best capable applicant would constitute a "fundamental alteration in the nature of the
program" and would be an unacceptable extension of § 504's meaning. See id
103. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 41.
106. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 121, 127.
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wise qualified handicapped individuals." 1 °7 This standard simultane-

ously calls for individualized consideration of a particular applicant's

qualifications in relation to the desired job,"0 8 and recognition that an
employer may demand a particular level of performance above mere
competence. 109
The notion "handicapped," which involves a characteristic of the applicant's relation to the rest of the human species, must therefore be distinguished from the notion "incapable," which involves a much more
specific relationship: that between the person and the task. 10 So understood, an incapable applicant is one who, for whatever reason, cannot
perform the designated tasks as required. Denial of employment to such
an applicant should not be unlawful. 1 ' There would be a violation of the

statute, however, if an applicant's capability were not meaningfully considered and he were simply presumed-by virtue of his handicap-to be
inadequate. " 2
The HHS regulations on this issue embrace two extremes and are both
inconsistent and overinclusive. Under the first approach, section 504 is
violated any time an applicant who is not incapable is denied employment. 113 The employer would arguably be obligated to hire that applicant even if he hoped to or actually was able to find a more qualified
candidate." 4 By requiring an employer to hire a less qualified handicapped individual over a more qualified nonhandicapped-or even hand107. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
108. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 100-01; see, e.g., Longoria v. Harris, 554 F. Supp.
102, 108 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (leg amputees cannot be categorically excluded as school bus
drivers); Doe v. Syracuse School Dist., 508 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (mental
illness deemed an invalid exclusionary criterion when irrelevant to job requirements);
Coleman v. Casey County Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 301, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (state
regulation requiring two natural legs for school bus driver license unlawfully excluded
otherwise qualified handicapped persons). See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
109. See Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533, 544 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (employer may
hire better qualified applicant), ajfd, 755 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985).
110. See Burgdorf, Who are "Handicapped"Persons?, in The Legal Rights of Handicapped Persons 4-10 (R. Burgdorf, Jr. ed. 1980) (distinguishing "disabled" from "handicapped"); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.13, .14 (1984) (employment criteria and
preemployment inquiries must be stated in job-related terms).
111. See supra notes 9, 109 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
113. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.3(k)(1), 84.12(b) (1984). Because the mere ability to perform
essential job tasks is the evaluative standard, and because job modification/restructuring
is among the reasonable accommodations contemplated, a capable candidate, with accommodation, is arguably never less capable to perform redefined tasks.
114. The regulations, by articulating job qualification as a set of minimum specifications, do not permit evaluation and differentiation on the basis of ability above the regulated minimum. See I Handicapped Requirements Handbook 630:1 (Federal Programs
Advisory Service July 1983). Having determined, for example, that the "occasional lifting of 50 pound boxes" is nonessential and can be performed by another employee, see
id., a court has no basis to differentiate between the accommodated applicant and the
applicant who is suddenly no longer better qualified.
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icapped" '-applicant, this approach exceeds the scope of the statute's
nondiscrimination mandate. The absence of an affirmative action requirement 1 6 suggests that section 504 does not compel this low threshold of quality. Moreover, imposing this threshold would effectively strip
the employer of his decisionmaking authority with respect not only to
those he chooses to hire but also to the tasks he requires his employees to
perform. Section 504's application would be virtually limitless." 7

At the other extreme are the regulations that tolerate blanket exclusions of all individuals possessing a particular characteristic-regardless

of whether an individual within the group is in fact capable-if the employer can articulate a rationale for such an exclusion.' 18 This approach

enables an employer to avoid considering a candidate's actual ability entirely and permits the inference that the mere presence of a handicap
renders a candidate unworthy of the job."1 9 As such, it undermines the
statutory purpose of the Rehabilitation Act: to guarantee equal opportunity to handicapped persons. 20 Equal opportunity requires that each

applicant receive individual consideration; 2 ' without this minimum, discrimination perpetuated by stereotyping will never be eradicated." z

Moreover, blanket exclusions draw bright lines that artificially distin115. This absurd result merely takes the approach described in note 114, supra, to its
unprohibited extreme.
116. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
117. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 1008.
118. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a) (1984) (tests or criteria that exclude on basis of handicap
need only be shown to be job-related).
119. An example of blanket exclusions in a context other than employment can be
found at 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b) (1984). The Department of Transportation lists various
medical infirmities that are deemed to render an individual incapable of holding a valid
interstate commercial driver's license. Thus, a diabetic on insulin, id. § 391.41(b)(3), and
an epileptic, id § 391.41(b)(8), may not be employed as interstate truck drivers, no matter how well controlled their afflictions are. See Costner v. United States, 720 F.2d 539,
543 (8th Cir. 1983); Monnier v. United States Dep't of Transp., 465 F. Supp. 718, 724
(E.D. Wis. 1979). These cases do not trigger § 504 because there is no recipient of federal
funds involved. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
120. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
121. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 101 ("The concern is individual ability, not the
presence or absence of a label."); Accommodating the Handicapped,supra note 70, at 175
("the statutory scheme contemplates that employers. . . will base their determinations
of whether a disabled applicant is 'otherwise qualified' for a particular program upon the
individual's actual capability. . . ."); see, e g., Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Blanket requirements must.. . be subject to the
same rigorous scrutiny as any individual decision denying employment to a handicapped
person."); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th Cir. 1981)
(upholding trial court's determination that applicant was improperly excluded on basis of
handicap when assumptions about relation of handicap to job were incorrect); Davis v.
Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applicants who meet every other selection
criteria cannot be categorically excluded by reason of their former drug abuse). Moreover, reasonable accommodation requires the elimination of blanket exclusions. See Gitter, supra note 24, at 980.
122. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 100; Accommodating the Handicapped,supra note
70, at 174-75.
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guish between degrees of disability. 2 3 The practice of labeling an individual as qualified or unqualified simply because he falls on one side or

the other of this arbitrary line ignores the fact that ability is distributed

across a spectrum, not in discrete categories.124 As a result of such prac-

tices, an individual might be denied employment on the basis of a condition that
does not. in fact impair his performance of the particular
25
tasks. 1
The integrity-of-the-program test suggested here exercises a principled
limitation on each of these extreme interpretations of section 504. By
affording an employer the flexibility to consider not merely whether, but
how well, an applicant can perform the job's tasks, the test ensures that

quality will not be compromised and that the job's integrity will not be

impaired."2 6 Similarly, by requiring an employer to look beyond the
mere existence of an applicant's handicap, consideration is given to the
particular applicant's ability to perform the tasks associated with a

job.'2 7 Thus, under the integrity-of-the-program test, individual consideration of ability is a threshold requirement of section 504.

Discrimination on the basis of ability, although permitted by the statute12 8 and regulations, 12 9 is nevertheless limited by the statute's purpose
and design: to remedy practices that discriminate solely on the basis of
one's handicap 3 ' and to require reasonable accommodations for handi-

capped individuals seeking employment. ' 3' Under the regulations, an
employer evaluating an applicant for employment is required to consider
123. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 620 (9th Cir. 1982)
(employer, by requiring blood sugar to be maintained at or below a particular level, drew
a line that medical opinion found to distinguish unreasonably between applicant's ability
and health risk); see generally Spectrum, supra note 6, at 86-101 (describing degrees of
handicap as a spectrum).
124. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 87-89.
125. See supra note 119.
126. An employer is always justified in preserving the integrity of the job by choosing
the best qualified candidate. Cf 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1984) (permitting employer to
protect "essential functions" of job). Protecting this discretion therefore requires a very
narrow construction not only of what constitutes a nonessential job function, but also of
the job-restructuring requirement. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
128. Discrimination is unlawful only if the applicant is "otherwise qualified." 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982). The Supreme Court has interpreted "otherwise qualified" to mean
"able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
129. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1984). See supra note 9.
130. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 10. In amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, Congress recognized the need for reasonable accommodation to help handicapped persons. See S. Rep.
No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 16-17; S. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6373, 6406; Meaning of Discrimination,
supra note 23, at 890 & n.43. The Supreme Court has also recognized the duty to accommodate. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979)
(dictum). The reasonableness of the accommodations required by § 504 should depend
on the performance of the accommodated employee and the cost of accommodation to
the employer. See supra notes 106-09, infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
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ways to adapt job requirements, make physical alterations, and in other
ways provide reasonable accommodations for handicapped individuals. 132 Intended to redress the problems faced by handicapped persons in
the job market, this obligation affords a handicapped applicant equal opportunity to meet the job's specifications. 3 It follows, therefore, that an
applicant's qualifications for a particular job should not be assessed until
accommodations that may qualify the applicant are identified.
Once the potential accommodations are taken into account, a court
should then determine whether the applicant's employment will undermine the integrity of the program. The applicant should be able to perform the job's tasks in a manner consistent with the employer's
expectation of benefits from the successful completion of those tasks." 4
If the applicant cannot meet this standard even with accommodation, it
would not be unlawful to deny him employment.
Competence always affects a determination of quality; it should therefore always be considered to be a legitimate expectation. 3 5 An employer's expectation of safety1 36 and organizational efficiency 3 1 may
similarly affect the overall determination of quality. A court should protect these expectations if it determines that the integrity of the program
requires such protection. Expectations that do not preserve the integrity
of the program should be regarded as impermissible grounds for rejecting

an applicant.
The safety of third persons and the protection of property should be
considered legitimate expectations.1 3 An employer has both the right to
132. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1984).
133. Seesupra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. One commentator has proposed an
"equal-burdens" standard for determining whether accommodations are required. Under
this standard, handicapped persons would be required to "confront the same burdens as
nonhandicapped persons." See Meaning of Discrimination, supra note 23, at 899. This

approach fails to address two problems identified by the Supreme Court: First, because
the standard requires that employers reduce their expectations to the lowest common
denominator by presenting all applicants, no matter how disabled, "equal burdens," it is
an impermissible extension of the section in the absence of an affirmative action requirement; second, because the standard does not create meaningful limits to the application of
the section, the varying degrees of disability create a bottomless lowest common denominator. A principled limitation must focus on the performance demanded by the employer, a focus merely on the capabilities of the applicant/employee is as open-ended as
the varying number and degrees of handicaps.
134. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 121, 127.
135. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text.
138. Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 623 n.3 (9th Cir.
1982). The statutory definition of "handicapped individual" explicitly takes this into account for alcohol and drug abusers, by excluding those alcohol and drug abusers from the
protection of § 504 who "would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of
others." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). This concern is equally valid for other classes of
handicapped individuals.
It is important to note that § 706(7)(B) permits exclusion of only those alcohol and
drug users whose use constitutes a direct safety threat. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
The use of the qualifier "direct" makes it clear that a mere "remote possibility" of injury
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expect safe performance by his employees 39 and the duty to guard
against injury to persons and property.'" A court should therefore protect the integrity of the job by permitting an employer to insist on a level
of performance that avoids such injury. 4 '
When the employer is concerned with the threat of injuries to the applicant/employee rather than to third persons, different issues arise. The
employer has a stake in the health of his employees. 142 On the other
hand, an individual has a right to expose himself to risk.' 4 3 When these
interests clash, a court must determine which has priority. In light of the
purpose of the Rehabilitation Act-to afford equal opportunity to handicapped individuals'---the employer's interests
should be secondary to
45
the autonomy of the handicapped applicant.'
is not a permissible ground for rejection. See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d
227, 231 (3d Cir. 1983); Analyzing Employment DiscriminationClaims, supra note 16, at
887.
Because a claimant's qualification for the task is a threshold issue that determines
whether he has standing to assert his claim, evaluating the safety issue at this stage is
unfair to the claimant because it precludes consideration of possible accommodations that
might eliminate the safety risks and, hence, render the job applicant qualified. The safety
concerns should be considered not at the stage of determining whether the applicant is a
handicapped person under the statutory definition before accommodations are considered, but rather at the stage when the applicant is determined to be qualified or not in
light of these potential accommoations. See The Right Toolsfor the Job, supra note 47, at
537 n.15, 546 (suggesting linear model of analysis similar to the model proposed in this
Note).
139. See Gittler, supra note 24, at 980; The Right Tools for the Job, supra note 47, at
551-52.
140. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (1957); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 317 (1976); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts, § 70, at 501-02 (5th ed. 1984). But cf Ross v. Gama Shoes, Inc., 28 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 150, 152 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1980) (in action brought under District
of Columbia handicap discrimination law, employer found to have no liability under respondeat superior theory because employee's actions were involuntary epilleptic seizures
outside scope of employment).
141. Obviously, an employer cannot insist on the elimination of all safety risks, because this would eliminate from consideration all candidates-handicapped and nonhandicapped alike. See Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 232 (3d Cir.
1983) (elimination not of all risks but merely "appreciable" risks is proper concern of
school bus driver licensing program, or else anyone who wore eyeglasses would pose a
risk and be rejected); The Right Toolsfor the Job, supra note 47, at 561 ("Total deference
to the safety-of-others defense is unwarranted."). See supra note 138. Moreover, these
concerns must not legitimize a blanket exclusion that avoids individual consideration and
possible accommodations. See Gittler, supra note 24, at 979; The Right Tools for the Job,
supra note 47, at 561-62.
142. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 1982)
(citing importance of "consistent attendence and an expectation of continuity" to employer). An employee's health will bear directly on his rate of absenteeism and length of
career, see id., and indirectly on the employer's expense for worker's compensation
claims, see The Right Tools for the Job, supra note 47, at 558.
143. See Spectrum, supra note 6, at 85; cf Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490
F. Supp. 948, 953-54 (D.N.J. 1980) (lower education context).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
145. See Bentivegna v. United States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir.
1982); The Right Toolsfor the Job, supra note 47, at 561; cf Poole v. South Plainfield Bd.
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An employer's interest in preserving his organizational efficiency could
also justify denial of employment to a handicapped applicant. The organizational structure enables an employer to design the allocation and performance of tasks in a way that promotes an integrated and wellsupervised workplace.' 4' Although a handicapped person may be able to
perform some of the tasks an employer assigns to a job, his inability to
perform other tasks could, under the HHS regulations, require the employer to restructure his plant design or the allocation of tasks as an
accommodation for the applicant. 4 7 When this accommodation adversely affects the quality of the workplace's output, a court should consider the accommodation unreasonable; 48 a refusal to restructure would
thus not constitute a violation of section 504.
2.

Cost of Accommodation

Considerations of cost have no relevance to whether a candidate is

qualified for a particular job.149 Cost is, however, a significant factor in
determining the reasonableness of the accommodations that qualify the

applicant for the job. 5 ' Having established that the quality of performance will not suffer if the applicant is employed, a court must still be
satisfied that the cost of accommodation will not constitute undue hardship to the employer's overall program.' s '

The issue of cost should be examined in the larger context of the or-

ganization in which the job exists.' 52 Here, the nature of the program
refers not to the performance of tasks and the expectation of benefits, but

of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 953-54 (D.N.J. 1980) (in lower education context "[t]he
purpose of § 504... is to permit handicapped individuals to live life as fully as they are
able, without paternalistic authorities deciding that certain activities are too risky for
them").
146. See Simon v. St. Louis County, 563 F. Supp. 76, 80-81 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aff'd, 735
F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1984); The Right Tools for the Job, supra note 47, at 551-52.

147. See 45 C.F.R § 84.12(b) (1984).
148. See Simon v. St. Louis County, 563 F. Supp. 76, 80-81 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (accommodations that would adversely affect morale and efficiency of police department are
unreasonable), aftd, 735 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1984); 1 Handicapped Requirements Handbook %640.4 (Federal Programs Advisory Service Jan. 1983) (alteration of workplace
that defeats objectives of facility would be unreasonable).
149. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
150. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979); 45
C.F.R. § 84.12(a), (c) (1984); Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 900-02; The
Right Tools for the Job, supra note 47, at 556.

151. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a), (c) (1984); The Right Toolsfor the Job, supra note 47, at
537 n.15.
152. See Meaningof Discrimination,supra note 23, at 900-02 (arguing for a strict defi-

nition of undue hardship to protect the statutory purpose). Because marginal cost will
commonly be incurred with any accommodation, see Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at
1012, such a strict definition is necessary. Organizational restructuring as an accommodation for one applicant may subject the organization to similar accommodations
throughout its structure. Evaluating the burden involved, however, should not be influenced by the cumulative effect of future accommodations because at the point accommodations become onerous, they constitute undue hardship and will not be required.
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rather to the particular purpose of the organization receiving federal

funds. 5 3 When the cost of accommodation is so substantial that the organization will have to fundamentally alter its overall program in order
to absorb it, 15 4 the cost constitutes undue hardship and is therefore unreasonable. The undue hardship standard therefore should be relative to

each organization,

55

and should be measured by whether the integrity of

the program is endangered.1 56 For example, if a medical clinic does not
have the resources to transcribe all of its records into braille so that a
blind clerk can be hired, but a major metropolitan hospital does, the cost

associated with the accommodation should constitute undue hardship for

the clinic but not for the hospital. 5 7
Cost to the program includes not only direct expenditures of money,
but also the consequences of a less efficient organizational structure. 58

The HHS regulations identify job restructuring as a possible accommo-

dation to qualify the handicapped applicant for employment. 5 9 The nature of the program determines the reasonableness of a particular
restructuring accommodation. If the requested restructuring would result in an impairment of the program's ability to carry out its organizational purpose, a court should consider the accommodations

unreasonable.' 6" Accordingly, it should find no violation if a handi-

capped applicant is rejected under these circumstances.
The regulations speak in terms of "incidental" and "essential" job
functions: When the restructuring involves only the elimination or modification of incidental tasks, the accommodations are reasonable and the
employer has an obligation to implement them; 1 61 when the restructuring
entails the elimination or modification of tasks deemed essential, however, the accommodations are neither reasonable nor required. 62 The
characterization of a task as "incidental" or "essential" to a particular
153. See Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 900-02.

154. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985) (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979)).
155. See Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 901.

156. Id. at 900-01 (cost alone is insufficient to establish undue hardship; cost must
impair ability of program to carry out its purpose); see Wegner, supra note 21, at 479
(recognizing "cost-plus defense" focusing on either ability of defendant to bear costs or
disproportion of costs to benefit).
157. Examples used by the HHS analysis of final regulations indicate similar results:
Small day care center may only be required to expend small amount to re-equip telephone
for hearing-impaired applicant, while school district may have to provide an aide for
blind applicant to teaching position, see 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, 16, at 308 (1984);
provision of interpreter for deaf employee could be reasonable for state welfare agency,
yet undue hardship for foster home care services, id.
158. See Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473, 478 (11th Cir. 1983); Simon v. St.
Louis County, 563 F. Supp 76, 80-81 (E.D. Mo. 1983), affid, 735 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir.
1984); The Right Toolsfor the Job, supra note 47, at 551-52.

159. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1984).
160. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
161. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1984).
162. See Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at 1011. When the restructuring eliminates
or modifies essential tasks, the integrity of the program is impaired, even if the program
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employment context often requires subjective evaluation;1 63 accordingly,
the employer's characterization should be accorded great respect.'64 The

consequences of interfering with job structure go beyond the limited context of one particular job: If one job must be restructured, it may be

difficult, if not impossible, to contain this obligation, and the employer

could conceivably lose the ability to structure his workplace at all.1 65 At
the same time, invidious discrimination should not be permitted under
the guise of organizational structure; when the existing structure does

not best preserve the integrity of the organization,
the duty to reasonably
166
accommodate may require restructuring.
B.

Post-Secondary Education Programs

Admission decisions in post-secondary education programs rest heavily on evaluations of ability 6 7 and raise many of the issues that are perti-

nent in the employment program context.1 68 Although post-secondary

educational institutions have a public responsibility to provide educational opportunities and resources, 169 society's interest in preserving the
quality of post-secondary education demands that a school's insistence

on able performance take precedence over its service function if these

interests conflict. 170 Nevertheless, because of the school's service func-

tion, under the integrity-of-the-program test proposed here the duty to
accommodate 17 ' contemplates greater affirmative efforts on the part of
these programs than are required in the employment context.172
A school should not exclude an applicant from consideration for admission solely on the basis of his handicap. 173 These blanket exclusions
should be considered impermissible because individual consideration is
the minimum that equal opportunity demands.' 74 At the same time,
can survive the restructuring. The employer should be permitted to best organize his
workplace, not merely to organize it well. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
163. This recognizes that the employer is in the best position to know his requirements. See Analyzing Employment DiscriminationClaims, supra note 16, at 896-97.
164. If the employer is penalized for his superior knowledge of the workplace by carrying the burden of proof concerning accommodations, see id., he should likewise be accorded deference to his superior knowledge as to which job functions are essential.
165. This would undermine the integrity of the program by vitiating employer discretion. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
166. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(2) (1984); see also Legal Evasiveness, supra note 6, at
1012 (normative assumptions about the design of the workplace should be flexible to
achieve greater participation by handicapped persons).
167. See supra notes 73-75, 78-86 and accompanying text.
168. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 & n.12 (1979).
Post-secondary education programs typically involve some aspect of job training. See
The Right Tools for the Job, supra note 47, at 556 n.167.
169. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
172. See Accommodating the Handicapped,supra note 70, at 179.
173. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
174. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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however, the school should not be required to admit an applicant who is
just minimally capable.' 75 The school and the students, as well 7as6

society, have a legitimate interest in seeking the best qualified students; 1

tolerating a lower standard of performance by handicapped students, in

the absence of an affirmative action requirement, would impermissibly

177
jeopardize the integrity of the program.
A school should not determine whether an applicant is qualified for
the course of study, however, without fully considering appropriate ac-

commodations.17 8 Although not required to sacrifice the overall quality
of its student body or teaching practices, a school may nevertheless be
required to alter considerably its presentation of services in order to permit participation by the handicapped applicant. 179 For example, if a
blind person, in order to facilitate his studies, requests exemption from a
school policy prohibiting the taping of lectures, a court should find it
reasonable and in keeping with the spirit of the statute to require the
175. One federal court recognized this:
Another factor which must be taken into account is that the qualification of a
handicapped person for admission to an institution turns not only on whether
he or she meets its reasonable standards but whether the individual, where a few
(in this case 170) must be chosen out of thousands of applicants, is as well
qualified despite the handicap as others accepted for one of the limited number
of openings. In performing the difficult task, where there are more qualified
applicants than places available, of making comparative judgments to determine
which are the most promising candidates, the institution is not required to accept a qualified handicapped person if the handicap renders that individual less
qualified than other qualified applicants.
Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981). The United States Commission on Civil Rights has also recognized this:
Unlike elementary and secondary education, there is no right to enrollment
in college or a vocational training program, per se. Admission to higher education programs raises threshold issues of merit and competition that are not a
factor at earlier levels of schooling. Consequently, the right to individualized
opportunity in higher education, although extensive, is not as sweeping.
Spectrum, supra note 6, at 120.
176. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981). See supra notes
78-86 and accompanying text.
177. Considerations of quality in the post-secondary education context, as in the employment setting, often involve concerns of safety. See Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 413 n.12 (1979); Grimard v. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171, 1174 (1st
Cir. 1978); Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The same
standards should apply to academic and employment programs in determining whether
safety is a protectable interest for the school. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying
text.
178. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979);
Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated as moot and
remanded, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047, 1059
(M.D.N.C. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D.S.C. 1977); 45
C.F.R. § 84.44 (1984).
179. The regulations indicate possible accommodations or modifications, including
"changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of specific courses required for the completion of degree requirements, and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are conducted." 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a)
(1984).
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school to accommodate him.'
The change in policy would have no
effect on the integrity of the program, because the applicant so accommodated would satisfy the school's performance requirements. Thus, in the
absence of any other performance concern, the school could not lawfully
deny the applicant admission.
A school may, however, refuse to admit the handicapped applicant if
accommodation would not render the applicant qualified.'
This was
the situation faced by the school in Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.'82 An applicant to the school's nursing program had a serious
hearing disability. The suggested accommodations-the elimination of
independent clinical courses-would have forced the school to admit,
and ultimately to certify as capable, a less qualified student, who "would
not receive even a rough equivalent of the training" the school normally
provided its graduates.1" 3 Under such circumstances, a refusal to accommodate is necessary to protect8 4the integrity of the program and therefore
should be considered lawful.'
Once appropriate accommodations are identified and the applicant is
found to be qualified, denial of admission should be unlawful unless the
cost associated with the accommodations constitutes undue hardship to
the post-secondary school's program.' 5 Undue hardship should be
found when the associated cost undermines the program's ability to perform its organizational purpose.' 6 Under this standard, if a student requires particularly expensive technology in order to become qualified, a
school may lawfully refuse to accommodate the student with such technology if the expense is beyond the school's budget."'
A post-secondary school's public service function requires these programs to make greater efforts than employers to accommodate handicapped applicants;18 however, like employment programs, undue
180. See 45 C.F.R § 84.44(b) (1984).
181. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979).
182. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
183. Id. at 410.
184. Although it has been argued that the school could have modified its program to fit
the abilities of Ms. Davis, see The Right Tools for the Job, supra note 47, at 554-55, such a
view would allow the integrity of the program to be impaired and would upset the priority of performance interests and admission discretion over service interests. See supra
notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
185. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 (1979); Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 900-02. But see Accommodating the Handicapped, supra note 70, at 179 (inferring that cost is not a factor in requiring post-

secondary education institutions to effect modifications); see also Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D.S.C. 1977) (despite possible financial burden, accommodations are required).
186. See Meaning of Discrimination,supra note 23, at 900-02.
187. To effect such accommodations, the school would have to divert resources
earmarked to serve other students to permit the handicapped student admission. When
the resources are substantial, it would constitute "a fundamental alteration in the nature
of [the] program" and hence would exceed the scope of § 504. Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979).
188. See Accommodating the Handicapped, supra note 70, at 179.
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hardship depends on the post-secondary school's ability to absorb the
cost of accommodation.' 9 The determination of undue hardship will directly affect the allocation of a school's scarce resources. 19 0 If the cost of

accommodating a handicapped applicant would impair the ability of the
school to serve the needs of its other students, a court would have to
balance the interests of the handicapped students against those of the
non-handicapped students; the absence of an affirmative action requirement should normally permit a school to refuse to accommodate.,
C. Services
The process of limiting the application of section 504 to preserve the
integrity of federal programs is somewhat simplified in the context of
lower education and health, welfare and social services.' 92 Because receipt of benefits is not conditioned on a participant's performance,19 3 individual ability is irrelevant. The program's9 4sole purpose is to provide
particular services to intended beneficiaries.'
Once these services and beneficiaries have been defined, the viability of
a section 504 claim against the program should depend on the determination of two threshold questions: whether the specific benefits sought by

the handicapped claimant are within the ambit of the defined services,
and whether the claimant is an intended beneficiary. If the court finds
the handicapped claimant to be entitled to the particular benefits he
seeks, the federal grantee generally cannot assert that accommodations

will undermine the integrity of the program, because service is the program's only function.' 9 5 The federal grantee can, however, refuse to ac-

189. For a discussion of undue hardship in the employment context, see supra notes
154-57 and accompanying text.
190. The determination is problematic and contextual; nevertheless a court should not
find a violation for failure to allocate these resources to accommodations when it finds the
integrity of the program would suffer. This guideline could prevent the dilemma faced by
one district court:
Defendant institution . . . is justifiably concerned with the financial burden
which it may ultimately have to bear as a result of compliance with § 794 in the
future. Although the danger of future expenditures under this statute is not a
proper consideration in this lawsuit, this court is most sympathetic with the
plight of defendant as a private institution which may well be forced to make
substantial expenditures of private monies to accommodate the federal government's generosity.
Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D.S.C. 1977). Under the integrity-ofthe-program test, such cumulative burdens are properly considered by the court only
when they actually constitute undue hardship.
191. See supra notes 41, 70 and accompanying text.
192. The application of § 504 to lower education programs is limited by the more specific remedies available under the Education of all Handicapped Children Act; resort
should be had not to § 504 but to the more specific remedies available under the more
specific statute. See Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3473-74 (1984).
193. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
195. An exception arises when permitting participation by the applicant poses a safety
hazard to other intended beneficiaries. See Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. CAB, 752 F.2d
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commodate the handicapped claimant, even if he is an intended
beneficiary,
when the cost of accommodation constitutes undue
196
hardship.

Undue hardship should be found when the cost of accommodation impairs the ability of the program to function-that is, to provide services
to its intended beneficiaries. Undue hardship invariably reflects the problem of scarce resources.' 97 This problem is particularly acute when a
program is funded entirely by public monies, as the programs in this
catagory often are.19 8 The determination of undue hardship should vary
according to the particular program and should reflect the intent of sec-

tion 504 that available funds be spent in a nondiscriminatory manner. t99
The mass transit setting provides a good illustration of the proper ap-

plication of this framework. A local transit authority should not be permitted to define its services as "riding on the subways, buses and other

presently available modes," because such a definition might prevent the
participation of handicapped persons. This narrow definition is not nec-

essary to limit the receipt of services to the population of intended beneficiaries, because everyone-or at least everyone who can pay the fare-is

intended to benefit. In the absence of a legislative determination,"

the

services should be termed "transportation"; this broader definition increases the likelihood that handicapped persons can participate in the
program, because accommodations need not be limited to presently available modes of transportation. Accommodations may not be required
under this broader definition, however, when particular modes already
exist and there are no funds available to develop alternative methods of
transportation that will permit greater participation by the handicapped.

In such a situation, the transit authority can properly claim that the in694, 720-21 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.
1984); Cavallaro v. Ambach, 575 F. Supp. 171, 175 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). The standard for
safety as a protectable interest should be the same as in the employment context. For a
discussion of safety in the employment context, see supra notes 136-43 and accompanying
text.
196. See Alexander v. Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 725 (1985); Meaning of Discrimination,
supra note 23, at 900-02.
197. See, e.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 653 (2d Cir. 1982); American
Public Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bartels v. Biernat,
427 F. Supp. 226, 232 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
198. Most of these cases arise with regard to lower education, public transit settings,
and public health programs, all of which are primarily supported by public monies.
199. The regulations provide a framework for analyzing the actions of federal recipients. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.4 (1984). Among the provisions is the following:
[A]ids, benefits, and services, to be equally effective, are not required to produce
the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain
the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement, in the most integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs.
Id. § 84.4(b)(2). Whether § 504 extends to the disparate effects analysis implied by the
regulations was an issue expressly not reached by the Supreme Court. See Alexander v.
Choate, 105 S. Ct. 712, 720 (1985).
200. See supra note 54.
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tegrity of its program-that is, its ability to provide transportation-will
be substantially undermined if required to develop these alternative
methods. Even under this definition, however, when the transit authority possesses or is granted more funds than are necessary to maintain the
present system, those funds should be used in a manner that affords
handicapped persons the greatest participation.2 ° '
Determining a legitimate allocation of resources may impose significant burdens on service program administrators. The Court in Alexander v. Choate2 °2 indicated that federal grantees were not obligated to
prepare "handicapped impact statements" for every action that might
adversely affect access to the service.2" 3 A federal grantee may escape
these administrative burdens by allocating resources in a reasonable manner."° If at some later time, however, it becomes apparent that the chosen allocation violates section 504, the federal grantee should change its
allocation. Failing this, a court must not shy away from requiring such a
change if the section is to have its intended effect.
The two components of the service program-the services and the intended beneficiaries-must be preserved if the program is to carry out its
organizational purpose. 20 5 The program may often impose eligibility re20 6
quirements in order to limit its services to its intended beneficiaries.
To be lawful, an eligibility requirement should be articulated in servicerelated terms. It should protect the availability of the services by limiting
their receipt to the intended beneficiaries, and it should be found necessary to protect the quality of the service intended. To uphold an eligibility requirement, a court should find that without the exclusionary
criteria, the integrity of the program would be substantially undermined,
either because permitting participation would substantially diminish the
quality of service received by other beneficiaries, or because the expense
of accommodation would create undue hardship.
Consider, for example, a program the service of which is the education
of elementary school age children. It would be appropriate to base eligibility on age because that requirement is service-related and, as such,
necessary to ensure that the service is limited to its intended beneficiaries.
In contrast, an eligibility requirement that would entitle only continent,
elementary school age children20 7 to the benefits of elementary school
201. A similar analysis results from an "equal-burdens" test. See Meaning of Discrimination, supra note 23, at 904-05.
202. 105 S. Ct. 712 (1985).
203. Id. at 725.
204. In other words, the recipient should be permitted to control the process of administering his funds.
205. See supra Pt. I.B.3.
206. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4) (1984).
207. These were essentially the facts presented in Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823 (5th
Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S,
Ct. 3371 (1984). In light of the Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct.
3457 (1984), holding that resort to the remedies provided under the Rehabilitation Act
are not available when a more specific statutory scheme controls the claim, cases arising
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education is not service-related; the intended beneficiaries are not limited
to continent, elementary school age children but extend to all children of
that age. Furthermore, requiring the program to serve children who cannot fulfill the continence requirement does not constitute undue hardship, because the expense necessary to tend to the needs of incontinent
children does not impair the program's ability to serve its other intended
beneficiaries. Thus, this eligibility requirement is not needed to protect
the integrity of the program and should consequently be found unlawful.
CONCLUSION

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act expresses society's desire to eliminate systematic and prejudicial discrimination against handicapped persons in federally funded programs. This worthwhile and ambitious goal
should not be thwarted by the practice of blanket exclusions, which unfortunately associates an inablility to participate with possessing a particular handicap. On the other hand, federal grantees must be permitted
some discretion to determine participation in their programs on the basis
of valid and objective criteria; often, this will involve a determination of
an applicant's ability. The balance between the interests of federal grantees and handicapped persons is best struck by analyzing discrimination
claims under an integrity-of-the-program test, which permits discriminating criteria if they are necessary to preserve the integrity of the federally funded program. Because the integrity of a particular program is
open to legislative or judicial definition, this test will permit the flexiblity
necessary to address the factual contexts in which discrimination claims
arise.
Steven H. Hinden
in lower education settings may not implicate rights and remedies available under the
Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 3473-74.

